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ACKNOWLEDGING AND PROTECTING
AGAINST JUDICIAL BIAS AT FACT-FINDING
IN JUVENILE COURT
Prescott Loveland*
ABSTRACT

As a public defender, I often represent young people from twelve
to seventeen years old in juvenile court. My juvenile clients face a
wide range of accusations and they come from various family
circumstances. Nearly all of my juvenile clients, however, are young
people of color from under-resourced communities. Many find
themselves arrested for typical adolescent behavior and others are
accused crimes that they did not commit. When counseling juvenile
clients, I carefully explain the nuances of the juvenile justice system
that is now aggressively examining their lives. I strive to provide
information that will help them make informed decisions in court
proceedings that treat them like adults despite their still-developing
adolescent brains. To some of my clients, for example, I must explain
that unless your behavior is nearly perfect in the coming months, you
may not be home with your family for a long time.
To many clients, I must explain the role of the judge in juvenile
court. Despite what you have seen on television, I explain, a judge—
not a jury—will decide whether or not you are “guilty” of the “crime”
that you are accused of. When making this decision, the judge will be
aware of all sorts of information that the judge is not permitted to
consider. The judge, for example, knows if you have been in trouble
before. The judge knows your family’s financial struggles, your
challenges at school, and the difficulties you may have had following
court orders. The judge might even know if you have not been
following the rules at home. To some clients, I also explain that the
judge will know about your statement to the police even after the
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judge tosses it from the case because you did not “confess”
voluntarily. I explain that the law requires us to act as if the juvenile
court judge is simply able to ignore all this information when making
the decision about whether you did what the police say you did. At
this point, juveniles often become aware that the juvenile court
process has some dangerously unfair features.
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INTRODUCTION
Judges, not juries, are the fact-finders in juvenile court because
most states do not recognize a jury right for juveniles.1 Failing to
adequately protect juveniles from the biases of juvenile court judges
can lead to innocent juveniles and their families being involved in a
juvenile justice system that has very serious consequences. This Essay
outlines how judges came to be the fact-finders in juvenile court and
explains ways that juvenile court judges are uniquely susceptible to
several types of bias that can undermine fact-finding.2 The distorting
influence of judicial biases can lead to inaccurate fact-finding and, in
turn, to the improper adjudication of children as “delinquent.”
Further, the failure to limit apparent bias can lead juveniles to
perceive juvenile court as inherently unfair, thereby undermining
their willingness to participate and their broader opinion of the justice
system. The risk of judicial bias at fact-finding in juvenile court can
and should be minimized by using juries or other protective
procedures.3
Part I of this Essay provides a brief history of the jury trial and of
juvenile courts. Part I also discusses the procedural protections that
the Supreme Court has extended to juvenile court, and the Court’s
decision in McKeiver to not extend a constitutional jury trial right to
juvenile court. Part II describes various forms of judicial bias that can
undermine fact-finding in juvenile court and it briefly discusses some
features of the jury trial system that can shield against bias. Part III
discusses how courts and policy-makers can protect juveniles from
judicial bias by either extending the jury right to juvenile court or by
instituting other protective measures.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JURY TRIAL AND OF JUVENILE COURT
This Part provides a brief overview of the jury trial protection in
criminal court and of the juvenile justice system, including the
1. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 5:3 (2d ed. 2017).
2. See infra Part II.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Supreme Court’s extension of certain Due Process protections to
juvenile court.
A. The American Jury Trial
An accused person’s right to a trial by jury has long been vital to
the American criminal justice system.4 The jury, as Justice Hugo
Black noted, is “one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in
the English-speaking world.”5 The jury traces back to the Magna
Carta in 1215, and it underpinned English common law.6 Trial by jury
was adopted by the Framers when the U.S. Constitution was ratified,
was included in the Bill of Rights via the Sixth Amendment,7 and was
incorporated to the states as a fundamental right through the
Fourteenth Amendment.8 Every state has adopted the right to a jury
trial in their state constitutions9 and has passed legislation
guaranteeing the right to a jury trial in serious criminal cases.10 The
Supreme Court has made clear that the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of a trial by jury in criminal cases is “fundamental to the American
scheme of justice.”11
The architects of the American justice system made the jury
foundational to assure fairer trials and to protect from “corrupt or
overzealous government action” including the biases of judges.12 In
deciding that the jury trial right is fundamental, the Supreme Court
explained in clear terms how important the jury is to check
government power:
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and
experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges

4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968).
5. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 34 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Andrew Treaster, Juveniles in Kansas Have a Constitutional Right
to a Jury Trial. Now What? Making Sense of In re L.M., 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1275,
1277–78 (2009) (discussing historical antecedents of the right to a jury trial); see also
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149
(holding that a right to a jury trial is a fundamental right applicable to states through
the Fourteenth Amendment).
9. See Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy
Relationship with the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 991–92 (2010); see also Javier M.
Vazquez, Appropriate Treatment for Juvenile Offenders: Juvenile Justice System v.
Jury System, 1 BARRY L. REV. 185, 199 (2000).
10. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 154.
11. Id. at 149; see also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210–11 (1968).
12. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 199.
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too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the
constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted
upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an
accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge . . . . [T]he jury
trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked
power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other
respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or
innocence.13

The jury also lends legitimacy to the adjudication process. The jury
is the primary link between courts and the communities that the
courts are supposed to serve. Through jury service, the community is
involved in the important decisions that courts make about life,
liberty, and justice. Since the inception of the American legal system,
juries have brought the community to the courtroom, helped “temper
the legal mind with a healthy dosage of common sense and human
emotion,”14 and have supplied a “nexus between the legislature’s
original intent and the community’s sense of justice.”15
B.

The American Juvenile Court

The first juvenile court was created in Illinois in 1899.16 By 1925,
nearly every state had some process aimed at adjudicating juveniles
accused of crimes differently than adults.17 The founders of juvenile
courts hoped that a separate system for juveniles would be one of the
generation’s great contributions to the status of children in American

13. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added).
14. W.J. Keegan, Jury Trials for Juveniles: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 PAC. L.J. 811,
835–36 (1977).
15. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 199 (citing Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 244–46
(1984)).
16. See Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the
Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 376
(1998).
17. Gerald P. Hill, Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury Trials in
Juvenile Proceedings Under the Sixth Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143, 145
(2008); see also Jennifer M. Segadelli, Minding the Gap: Extending Adult Jury Trial

Rights to Adolescents While Maintaining a Childhood Commitment to
Rehabilitation, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 683, 686 (2010).
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society.18 Juvenile courts inquired more deeply into juveniles’
individual circumstances, such as school, family, home life, and court
history.19 An overarching ideal of these new juvenile courts was
rehabilitation over punishment.20 Parens patriae, often considered
the founding principle of American juvenile justice, is the idea that
the state has a duty to intervene and care for so-called “troubled”
children.21 Juvenile courts sought to be more sympathetic and less
formal, and to make determinations about the best interests of
children who were perceived as “youngsters whose crimes were the
product of immaturity.”22
In an effort to protect juveniles from the harsh strictures of the
adult criminal system, unique features were introduced, such as closed
and confidential hearings, clinical examinations, broad and exclusive
jurisdiction, more lenient sentencing, and judges rather than juries as
fact-finders.23 The judge’s role expanded to one that was allencompassing: managing the case, learning about the juvenile’s life,
ruling on evidentiary disputes, sentencing juveniles, and also—despite
all the inadmissible information the judge was privy to—adjudicating
guilt through bench trials rather than jury trials.24
Regardless of the intent to create a system that was unique from
the adult criminal justice system, juvenile courts have evolved to
closely resemble adult criminal courts over the last fifty years. For
instance, juvenile justice in every state has shifted toward an approach
18. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE

JUSTICE 42, 45 (Margaret K. Rosenheim, Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus &
Bernardine Dohrn eds., 2002).
19. See generally William Hannan, Judicial Waiver as the Only Equitable Method
to Transfer Juvenile Offenders to Criminal Court, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 193, 197–98 (2008). See also DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY,
CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 478–79, 499 (3rd ed.
2007).
20. Hill, supra note 17, at 145; see also Segadelli, supra note 17, at 689.
21. DAVID L. MYERS, EXCLUDING VIOLENT YOUTHS FROM JUVENILE COURT: THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 12–13 (2001).
22. ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE
JUSTICE 4 (2008); see also Hannan, supra note 19, at 193, 196; Stacey Sabo, Rights of
Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
2425, 2430 (1996).
23. Tanenhaus, supra note 18, at 69–70; see also Segadelli, supra note 17, at 689.
24. See Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics for
Contemporary Reforms, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE
JUSTICE 216, 231–32 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014)
(describing the contrast between the early juvenile court where the judge had
tremendous power and discretion over all matters of the case and the post-Gault
expansion of prosecutorial power at the expense of judicial and probation authority).
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“that often holds young offenders to the same standard of criminal
accountability [as] adults.”25 The resemblances between juvenile and
adult courts are now apparent in how juveniles are regarded, in the
procedural rights they are afforded,26 in the similarities between
juvenile and adult jails, and in the punishments received.27 The
jurisdiction of juvenile court also continues to shrink as more
juveniles are transferred to adult court.28 Increasing numbers of
children are receiving adult-like sentences and are being prosecuted
in juvenile court for normal juvenile behavior.29
Some scholars attribute this punitive shift in juvenile justice to the
Due Process procedural protections extended to juvenile courts by
the Supreme Court.30 Other commentators perceive the shift as a
hasty response to an increase in juvenile crime in the 1970s through
1990s.31 During that time, people and politicians became increasingly
uneasy with the informality of juvenile courts and skeptical of
juvenile courts’ ability to properly handle juveniles who were
considered violent.32 Prompted in part by sensationalized juvenile
crime,33 people latched on to a fiction of the so-called juvenile “super
predator,” now commonly recognized to be a veiled racial term used
to frighten support for harsher treatment of juveniles of color.34 The
25. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22.
26. See discussion infra Section I.C.
27. Margaret K. Rosenheim, The Modern American Juvenile Court, in A
CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 342; see also Segadelli, supra note
17, at 715; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22.
28. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 4–5.
29. See Andrea L. Dennis, Decriminalizing Childhood, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1,
5 (2017); see also Rosenheim, supra note 27, at 342.
30. See Klein, supra note 16, at 377–78.
31. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 4–5, 11, 94, 105; see also Michelle
Haddad, Catching Up: The Need for New York State to Amend Its Juvenile

Offender Law to Reflect Psychiatric, Constitutional and Normative National Trends
Over the Last Three Decades, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 455, 484

(2009).
32. Rosenheim, supra note 27, at 342; Segadelli, supra note 17, at 689.
33. Segadelli, supra note 17, at 689; see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at
4–5.
34. See Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-onbus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html [https://nyti.ms/2k1jqTu]; John Kelly,

Juvenile Transfers to Adult Court: A Lingering Outcome of the Super-Predator
Craze, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Sept. 28, 2016), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/

juvenile-justice-2/juvenile-transfers-adult-court-lingering-outcome-super-predatorcraze/21635 [https://perma.cc/7VGJ-Q55G]; Kirsten W. Savali, For the Record:
‘Superpredators’ is Absolutely a Racist Term, THE ROOT (Sept. 30, 2016),
http://www.theroot.com/for-the-record-superpredators-is-absolutely-a-racist-t-17908
57020 [https://perma.cc/Z8H9-AHWY].

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

290

[Vol. XLV

punitive shift in juvenile justice grew from highly impulsive legislative
overhauls as sweeping changes were made to juvenile justice policies
with hardly any debate or review.35 No doubt, these punitive changes
detracted from meaningful investment in a juvenile justice process
that was data-driven or truly rehabilitative.
Now resembling adult criminal courts, juvenile courts have strayed
far from their founding principles.36 Some features of juvenile justice,
however, remain distinct. In most jurisdictions, for instance, care and
rehabilitation remain the stated purpose of the juvenile court,
probation officers are involved early in the process, and a number of
less harsh sentencing options are still available.37 Importantly, in
most jurisdictions, judges, not juries, remain the juvenile court factfinders.38
C.

Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court

The Supreme Court has recognized a number of constitutional
rights for juveniles facing criminal accusations. In 1967, the Supreme
Court decided In re Gault.39 Fifteen-year-old G.G. faced charges that
he placed a lewd phone call to a neighbor.40 For this “crime” an adult
offender would receive a $50 fine and no more than sixty days in
jail.41 Young G.G. was convicted and committed to an “industrial
school”—that is, a juvenile prison—for six years, until age twentyone.42
During the process of adjudication, G.G. was denied
procedural rights to which an adult offender would have been

5.

35. See Klein, supra note 16, at 377–78; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 4–

36. See Haddad, supra note 31, at 484–90; see also CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S LAW &
POLICY, POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE: PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND POLICY PREFERENCES
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS REFORM 2 (2007), https://www.macfound.org/
media/article_pdfs/CCLPPOLLINGFINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/7L8P-DDQH].
See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 11–13. In recent years, federal
incentives, state policies, and public opinion reflect a potential shift back towards
more rehabilitative approaches in some states.
37. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at § 1:3; see also NEELUM ARYA, CAMPAIGN FOR
YOUTH JUSTICE, STATE TRENDS: LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES FROM 2005 TO 2010:
REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (2010),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7M6Z-3MHX] (comparing requirements between adult and juvenile
systems).
38. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at § 5:3.
39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id. at 8–9; see also DEAN JOHN CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM:
DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING, AND THE LAW 52 (4th ed. 2003).
42. Segadelli, supra note 17, at 690.
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entitled. He was, for example, never provided an opportunity to face
or question his accuser, he was not advised that he had the right not
to make a statement, he was subjected to proceedings during which
witnesses were not sworn, and transcripts were not made.43
In re Gault went to the Supreme Court and, in a landmark
decision, the Court held that, as in adult criminal court and under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, juveniles accused of
crimes have the right (1) to notice of charges, (2) to counsel, (3) to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and (4) to privilege
against self-incrimination.44 The Court noted that despite the good
intentions behind the juvenile system, “unbridled discretion . . . is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”45 The
Court’s rationale built on its recent decision in Kent v. United
States,46 where the Court acknowledged that in juvenile court “the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”47 In Gault, the
Court addressed some, but not all, of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights that had already been afforded to adults accused of crimes.
Notably, the Court did not meaningfully address the issue of a
juvenile’s right to a jury trial.48
A few years later, in 1970, the Court decided In re Winship, a case
involving a twelve-year-old charged with stealing money from a
purse.49 The Court in Winship held that the standard of proof to
which juveniles are entitled is proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
rather than a preponderance of the evidence.50 The Court held that
the evidentiary standard in juvenile delinquency proceedings must
align with that of adult criminal proceedings, as “the same
considerations that demand extreme caution in fact-finding to protect
the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child,” particularly
because an individual’s freedom and autonomy are also at stake in
juvenile court.51 The Court said that Due Process requires the
government to produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to ease

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 18.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).

Id. at 556.

Segadelli, supra note 17, at 691.
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 367.
Id. at 365.
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the minds of the fact-finders and to protect the innocent from
punishment.52 Yet, the Court said nothing, not even in dicta, about
how juries also have an important protective purpose, especially
because of judicial bias.53
D. McKeiver : No Right to a Jury Trial in Juvenile Court Under the
Constitution
In 1971, one year after Winship, the Court decided McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania.54 Despite its increasing willingness to extend Due
Process protections to juveniles in the face of the juvenile system’s
shortcomings, the Court, by plurality opinion, held that juveniles do
not have a right to a jury trial in the fact-finding phase of juvenile
court.55 Saying very little about judicial bias and citing no meaningful
data, the plurality conclusively asserted that juries are not necessary
to accurate fact-finding because juries are not more capable than
judges of making fact determinations.56
The plurality briefly
57
addressed the “worst of both worlds” shortcomings of juvenile court
that were described in Kent and Gault, as well as some of the biasrelated critiques of having a judge as fact-finder.58 But the Court then
simply reasoned that juries for juveniles would make the proceedings
too adversarial and risk imposing a criminal court process on juvenile
court, thereby undermining the need for a separate juvenile court at
all.59
In the dissent, Justice Douglas, with Justices Black and Marshall
joining, espoused that constitutional jury trial rights should be
extended to juveniles.60 The dissent noted the serious consequences
of juvenile court, including the substantial restrictions on liberty and
the similarities between adult jails and juvenile detention centers.61

52. Id. at 364; Segadelli, supra note 17, at 691–92.
53. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 358.
54. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
55. Id. at 545.
56. Id. at 543, 547.
57. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 18 n.23 (1967).
58. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 558.
61. Id. at 559 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 4 (Black, J., concurring)) (recognizing the
serious restrictions on liberty that juveniles are subjected to and noting that “[w]here
a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged, and convicted for
violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by the State to be confined for six
years, . . . the Constitution requires that [the juvenile] be tried in accordance with the
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The dissent also noted two important concepts that the plurality did
not meaningfully address: the potential for bias among judges and
juveniles’ perception of whether they are treated fairly.62
II. JUDICIAL BIAS IN JUVENILE COURT: A REALITY OFTEN
IGNORED
The jury in a criminal trial protects innocent people from the
adverse consequences of a criminal conviction. In McKeiver, the
Court did not extend the jury protection to juveniles despite the
resemblance between juvenile and criminal court.63 The Court
asserted that juries have not been necessary for accurate fact-finding,
citing the absence of juries in equity cases, probate matters,
deportation hearings, and other civil matters.64 In defense of its
decision, the Court also cited the Duncan Court’s statement: “[w]e
would not assert that every criminal trial—or any particular trial—
held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be
as fairly treated by a judge as [s/]he would be by a jury.”65 The
McKeiver plurality, however, paid little attention to the concept of
judicial bias.66
This Part outlines various biases to which juvenile court judges are
susceptible. It also discusses ways that juries are less susceptible to
these biases and addresses some critiques of the jury system. The
potential for judicial bias should not be ignored by lawmakers and
judges who are considering how to structure fact-finding in juvenile
courts.
A. Judicial Biases that Can Undermine Juvenile Court Fact-Finding
Without a jury or other procedural protections, juvenile court
judges are susceptible to various types of bias that can undermine
fact-finding, thereby threatening to subject innocent young people to
the consequences of a juvenile conviction.

guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment”).
62. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 562–63.
63. See supra Section I.D.
64. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.
65. Id. at 543 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968)).
66. Id. at 552 (White, J., concurring).
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Bias from Exposure to Inadmissible Information

One of the most apparent biases to which juvenile court judges are
vulnerable is bias from constant exposure to information that is
typically not admissible at the fact-finding stage. Juvenile court
judges, for instance, preside over hearings where testimony and
evidence are elicited, such as hearings about whether a juvenile
should be detained pending trial and hearings about whether a
juvenile is to be transferred to adult court.67 During the process,
judges receive information that is often not admissible at trial,
including information about tangible evidence, alleged identification
evidence, and alleged statements that children made.68 Juvenile court
judges also oversee juveniles’ compliance with pre-trial court
conditions and monitor juveniles’ participation in social service
programs.69 Thus, judges become intimately aware of information
that threatens to shape their opinion about accused juveniles before
fact-finding—that is, before the government is supposed to use only
admissible evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.70 For
example, while managing the case, pre-trial judges learn if accused
children are not abiding by curfew, if they are missing school, if they
are not reporting to counseling, or even if children are not listening to
their parents’ rules.71 Similarly, inadmissible information can reach
the judge “as a result of offhand remarks by a clerk or bailiff made in
the judge’s presence or even by reviewing the court file.”72
Even the most careful judges are, after all, human.
And
psychological evidence and social scientific studies show that humans,
in general, have great difficulty deliberately disregarding

67. See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and
Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L.

REV. 553, 584 (1998).
68. Id. at 571.
69. Cf. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550 (acknowledging “[c]oncern about . . . the
juvenile court judge’s possible awareness of the juvenile’s prior record and of the
contents of the social file; about repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses
in the persons of juvenile and probation officers and social workers”).
70. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 572; accord FED. R. EVID. 402.
71. See John Stuart & Philip Bush, It’s Time for Jury Trials in Juvenile Court,
50 HENNEPIN LAW. 8, 9 (1981) (“[A] juvenile court judge often follows the
development of a juvenile respondent and his or her family for several years.”).
72. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 208; see also Commonwealth v. Goodman, 311 A.2d
652, 654 (Pa. 1973) (holding that a judge should honor a defendant’s request to recuse
himself where the judge receives inadmissible evidence during pre-trial that is “highly
inflammatory”).
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information.73 Juries, in contrast, are carefully shielded from
inadmissible information by the rules of procedure and evidence.74
Juries are shielded from this information precisely because of its
potential for creating bias; indeed, when the jury is exposed to this
type of information, it is common grounds for granting a mistrial.75
Yet, juvenile judges have regular access and exposure to this
inadmissible information and are expected to play “mental
gymnastics” by ignoring it.76 This is a fiction that the rest of the
justice system, including appellate courts, upholds despite the
empirical and anecdotal evidence suggesting that prejudicial
information influences judges’ decisions.77

2.

Political Bias

Political pressures can also compromise fair decision-making at
fact-finding. One study by sociologist Alexes Harris about the
California juvenile waiver hearing process included interviews with
juvenile court judges in California.78 Harris found that important
goals for juvenile court judges were to retain their position and to be

73. See Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1323 (2005); see
also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 572 (citing Michael J. Saks, What Do
Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL.

INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 27 (1997)).
74. See, e.g., FED R. EVID. 403.
75. See, e.g., JULIE LEWIS ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL VOL. 2,
TRIAL § 31.4 (John Rubin eds., 2d ed. 2012), http://defendermanuals.sog.unc.edu/
sites/defendermanuals.sog.unc.edu/files/pdf/31.4.pdf [https://perma.cc/697D-VYX8];
see also Izzy Kapnick, Mistrial Declared in Murder-for-Hire Case Featured On TV’s
Cops, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/
mistrial-declared-in-murder-for-hire-case-featured-on-cops/ [https://perma.cc/TBF2E9UZ]; Judge Declares Mistrial in Roger Clemens Case, THE TAKEAWAY (Jul. 15,
2011), http://www.wnyc.org/story/146468-judge-declares-mistrial-roger-clemens-case/
[https://perma.cc/RWC7-NUDQ]; Mistrial Declared in Clemens’ Perjury Trial, NPR
(July 14, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/14/137858529/mistrial-declared-inclemens-perjury-trial [https://perma.cc/73HX-WAPQ)].
76. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 573 (“Although judges
undoubtedly are better than juries at ignoring or not acting upon inadmissible
evidence, it strains the imagination to believe that a judge would not be affected by
knowledge of a confession, if only at an unconscious level.”).
77. See id. at 572 (citing Saks, supra note 73, at 27). See generally Wistrich et al.,
supra note 73, at 1251–52.
78. Alexes Harris, Diverting and Abdicating Judicial Discretion: Cultural,
Political, and Procedural Dynamic in California Juvenile Justice, 41 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 387, 392 (2007) (“Thirty years after the ‘constitutional domestication’ of the
juvenile court, a more punitive approach to crime and justice increasingly guides the
juvenile system.” (internal citations omitted)).
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promoted beyond juvenile court.79 Judges commonly “sought to
create reputations that would generate prestige and connections to
elected [office].”80 Judges were concerned about how their judging
abilities were perceived by the public, including the views of police,
media, and government agencies.81 With surprising candor, for
example, judges admitted that implications for their reputation makes
them sentence more severely.82
Harris helps demonstrate that legally irrelevant factors such as
personal ambition, the perceptions of others, and favoritism for more
conservative case outcomes can unduly influence judicial decisions at
fact-finding. Based on the openness of the judges in the Harris Study,
one can easily imagine a judge who, under political pressure, is
influenced to rule against young people at fact-finding or who is
reluctant to truly hold the government to its burden of proving a case
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jurors, on the other hand, are simply not subject to the same
political pressures. They are not typically affiliated with the court
system, and individual juror decisions on a verdict are not subject to
the same level of transparency or scrutiny from other judges, from
police, or from government agencies.83

3.

Situational Bias

Judges are also susceptible to situational biases, that is, extraneous
variables that should have no bearing on legal decisions. In one oftcited study by Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso,84 researchers
recorded how parole decisions made by experienced judges related to
the judges’ two daily food breaks.85 This study found that favorable
rulings for legally similar cases dropped gradually from about sixty79. Id. at 399; see also Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, A Common
Code: Evaluating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 132

(2011).
80. Harris, supra note 78, at 399.
81. See id.
82. See Neitz, supra note 79, at 132.
83. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 528 (2014) (holding that jurors may not
testify about what went on during deliberations, even to expose dishonesty during
jury selection); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (“[L]ong-recognized
and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from
intrusive inquiry.”). But see Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 866 (2017)
(noting an exception to the usual rule that jury deliberations are secret when
evidence of extreme racial or ethnic bias emerges).
84. Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889, 6889 (2011).
85. Id.
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five percent to zero percent within each period between food breaks
and then rose again abruptly to about sixty-five percent immediately
after a break.86 Ultimately, the likelihood of a favorable ruling was
greater at the very beginning of the work day or after a food break
than it was later in the succession of cases.87
This study bolsters a growing body of evidence suggesting that
experienced judges are indeed susceptible to psychological biases,
even small psychological biases associated with their particular
situation.88 The danger of bias is real: “legally irrelevant situational
determinants—in this case, merely taking a food break—may lead a
judge to rule differently in cases with similar legal characteristics.”89
The extent to which the results of this study translate from a parole to
a fact-finding context is not entirely clear. However, if something as
simple as a food break threatens the outcome of judicial decisionmaking, one can easily imagine other legally irrelevant circumstances
that have undue influence—such as the amount of sleep a judge has
had, the sadness a judge is feeling, or the amount of stress a judge is
under at home.
While situational biases are not unique to judges, and can of course
have some impact on jurors as well, the design of the jury system
provides some inherent protection against such biases. The jury is a
group making a fact-finding decision about one case, rather than an
individual judge repeatedly making decisions about multiple, often
similar, cases.90 Jurors as a group of decision-makers serve to check
and balance one another’s small psychological influences.

86. Id. at 6889; see also Ed Yong, Justice is Served, but More So After Lunch:
How Food-Breaks Sway the Decisions of Judges, DISCOVER MAG.: NOT EXACTLY
ROCKET SCI. (Apr. 11, 2011), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/
2011/04/11/justice-is-served-but-more-so-after-lunch-how-food-breaks-sway-thedecisions-of-judges/#.WgtACRNSzow [https://perma.cc/PQ29-HSP7].
87. Danziger et al., supra note 84, at 6890.
88. Id. at 6892; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 777, 782 (2001); Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts,

Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property
Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 96
(1987); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2011). See generally Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts Judicial
Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188 (2006); Neil Vidmar,
The Psychology of Trial Judging, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 58
(2011).
89. Danziger et al., supra note 84, at 6892.
90. See infra Section II.B.1.
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Bias from Having Multiple Roles and a Repetitive Job

Juvenile court judges are susceptible to bias by virtue of the many
different roles they serve in juvenile court, the pressures associated
with those roles, and by the repetitive nature of their jobs.
In addition to being fact-finders, for example, juvenile court judges
also sentence juveniles, manage the progression of the case, direct
and manage the courtroom, and monitor pre-trial release
conditions.91 In the process, judges frequently hear reports about the
juveniles from probation officers, social workers, and agencies.92
Managing busy court calendars can create pressure that
undermines their fact-finding decisions. Juvenile courts—often
“perceived as less important”93—are frequently not resourced well
enough, which adversely affects staffing.94 Heavy judicial caseloads
can create increased anxiety about greater efficiency. For judges who
are under consistent pressure to be more efficient, an excessive
docket makes it “difficult to spend the time you want on each case,”95
creating the risk of spending insufficient time and attention on factfinding. These multiple responsibilities and pressures create a risk
that important facts will be missed or forgotten by the juvenile court
judge.96
Further, the repetitive nature of sitting in the same court over years
and hearing the same types of cases increases judges’ familiarity with
police officers, probation officers, as well as with particular juveniles
and certain neighborhoods.97 Dealing with cases similar to those that
they have heard in the past risks that judges will base decisions on
factual precedent and prejudices, rather than on the unique
circumstances presented by each case.98 For example, a judge’s
experience presiding over many criminal and juvenile cases may make
judges “unduly skeptical of the testimony of the accused . . . [because]
they tend to hear the same stories repeatedly.”99 Jaded perspectives
or insufficient attention to the testimony of an accused juvenile can
undercut fact-finding. Familiarity with police officers can as well. If

91. See Feld, supra note 15, at 231; see also infra Section II.B.
92. See Feld, supra note 15, at 231; see also infra Section II.B.
93. Neitz, supra note 79, at 115 (quoting Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court
and the Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 26 (1992)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
97. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 208–09.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 579.
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judges assume, based on experience, that a certain officer is
trustworthy, they will naturally tend to “presume that the officer will
not lie [and will therefore be] less likely to subject the officer’s
testimony to . . . rigorous scrutiny that would expose possible
untruths.”100
Judges will be “likely to presume that [any]
inconsistenc[ies are] the result of a mistake or misunderstanding,
rather than from fabrication.”101
Juries, on the other hand, are not as susceptible to the same biases
and pressures associated with role and repetition. Jury service is
infrequent and jurors are routinely excluded from any cases where
they are familiar with a witness or party, and they are instructed to be
singularly focused on the evidence and its application to the law.102
The protection of a jury decreases the risk of overlooking salient facts
because, simply, there are more people paying attention. Indeed, as
the Supreme Court has acknowledged, members of a group may
remember testimony that other group members have forgotten.103
The pressures to multi-task and to be efficient are not as heavy on
jurors as they are on juvenile judges. While jurors may seek to wrap
cases up quickly to get home to their families or get back to work, the
external pressures facing judges are simply not present for the jury.

5.

Corruption Bias

Many of the biases discussed to this point are biases that can be
subtle or inadvertent on the part of judges. Judges, however, are also
more susceptible than juries to intentional biases. Corruption bias,
for instance, is engaging in illegal activity from the bench. Accepting
bribes or favors and participating in illegal ex parte communications
are common enough to demand sufficient protection against such
behavior. In early 2011, two juvenile court judges in Pennsylvania—
Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan—were convicted of receiving
millions of dollars from private juvenile detention facilities in
exchange for sending young people to those facilities after
adjudicating them delinquent.104 Hundreds of young people and their

Vazquez, supra note 9, at 208.
Id.
See, e.g., 1-II Criminal Jury Instructions for DC Instruction 2.102 (2017).
See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 (1978).
Neitz, supra note 79, at 98; John Schwartz, Clean Slates for Youth Sentenced
Fraudulently, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

27judges.html [https://nyti.ms/2gZOfJg] (noting that youth advocacy groups often
complained about the unusually harsh nature of Judge Ciavarella’s adjudications);
Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youth for
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families were affected when these two judges detained children in
facilities away from their homes, families, and schools.105 Without
doubt, perceptions of fairness about the process were undermined as
well.
While incarcerating children in exchange for cash is, indeed, an
extreme example of corruption bias among judges, it is far from the
only example.
Judges have engaged in illegal ex parte
communications, inappropriate sexual relationships, collusion,
inappropriate comments, preferential treatment,106
and overt
racism.107 While many judges strive to be impartial and fair, far too
many have proven susceptible to corruption, which threatens factfinding as well as all other aspects of the juvenile court process,
thereby undermining the legitimacy of the institution.

Profit,

N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/
13judge.html [https://nyti.ms/2jGLG0i].
105. See Neitz, supra note 79, at 98; Schwartz, supra note 104; Urbina & Hamill,
supra note 104.
106. See, e.g., In re Esworthy, 77 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y. 1991) (per curium)
(upholding decision of State Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove juvenile
court judge from bench for, among other things, making inappropriate comments
during a juvenile delinquency proceeding); see also Former Circuit Court Judge
Reprimanded for Improper Sexual Relationship, WBKO (Feb. 24, 2017),
http://www.wbko.com/content/news/Former-Circuit-Court-Judge-reprimanded-forimproper-sexual-relationship-414739073.html [https://perma.cc/YS8H-2X4C]; Jason
Grant, Judge Quits Bench Amid Alleged Duct Tape Threat, Ex Parte Talks, N.Y.
L.J. (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202795663177/JudgeQuits-Bench-Amid-Alleged-Duct-Tape-Threat-Ex-Parte-Talks?slreturn=20170816
141054 [https://perma.cc/3SSM-57SZ]; Max Mitchell & Lizzy McLellan, As Officials
in Centre County Face Discipline, Appeals May Follow, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER
(Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202797180584/As-Officialsin-Centre-County-Face-Discipline-Appeals-May-Follow?slreturn=20170816142547
[https://perma.cc/4JC2-8CBN]; Alex Wolf, 2 Philly Judges Removed for Case Fixing
Scheme, LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/875085/2-phillyjudges-removed-for-case-fixing-scheme [https://perma.cc/BN8V-2L6M].
107. Neitz, supra note 79, at 131 (“[A] juvenile court judge in Tennessee was
publicly censured for his habit of ruling against immigrant juveniles ‘based solely on
the real or perceived immigration status’ of the children or their parents. In a formal
Letter of Reprimand, the Court of the Judiciary noted that this judge’s actions
displayed ‘a perceived predetermination as to Hispanic individuals appearing before
[him].’”) (citing Formal Letter of Reprimand from the Hon. Don R. Ash, Presiding
Judge, Tenn. Court of the Judiciary, to the Hon. A. Andrew Jackson, Dickson Cty.
Gen. Sessions Judge, (May 16, 2008), [hereinafter Formal Letter of Reprimand]
http://www.tba2.org/tbatoday/news/2008/judicialreprimand_051608.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X345-RE7P]); see also Aldrich v. State Comm’n on Judicial
Conduct, 447 N.E.2d 1276, 1277 (N.Y. 1983) (per curium) (upholding decision of
State Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove juvenile court judge from bench for
using “profane, improper and menacing language” and making “inappropriate racial
references” during proceedings).
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The jury, while of course not immune from illegality,108 is by design
more insulated from ex parte communications and overt illegality
because juries are composed of multiple members that check one
another,109 and their communications are limited and carefully
monitored.110 Bribing a juror is far more difficult since their identity
is unknown until they are selected for trial, which gives little time to
approach them.111

6.

Racial Bias

Juvenile court judges are susceptible to racial bias, both explicit
and implicit. Judges themselves have acknowledged the problem of
bias. U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Bernice B. Donald
candidly acknowledged to a group of judges and lawyers at the 2016
ABA Annual Meeting: “[e]ach of us in doing our jobs are viewing the
functions of that job through the lens of our experiences, and all of us
are impacted by biases, stereotypes and other cognitive functions that
enable us to take shortcuts in what we do.”112
Concerns over racial bias in juvenile court are underscored by
pervasive racial disparities in the juvenile justice system.113 Black
108. See, e.g., Alberto Luperon, Jessica Chambers Murder Trial Juror Booted
After Posting on Facebook, LAW NEWZ (Oct. 11, 2017), https://lawnewz.com/high-

profile/juror-dismissed-in-jessica-chambers-murder-trial-after-posting-on-facebook/
[https://perma.cc/LT82-CFVX]; Kelly Puente, Did a Juror Get Too Chatty at a
Fountain Valley Nail Salon, Putting a Murder Conviction in Trouble?, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.ocregister.com/2017/10/12/did-a-juror-gettoo-chatty-at-a-fountain-valley-nail-salon-putting-murder-a-conviction-in-trouble/
[https://perma.cc/GD6Z-ZQVF]; Eric Shorey, October 17, 1931: Al Capone
Convicted for Tax Evasion, OXYGEN (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.oxygen.com/blogs/
october-17-1931-al-capone-convicted-for-tax-evasion [https://perma.cc/3ZUP-6UQ5].
109. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
110. See, e.g., 1-II Criminal Jury Instructions for DC Instruction 2.509 (describing
the very limited ways in which jurors are authorized to communicate with parties).
111. See RANDOLF N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 16 (2003).
112. Judges: 6 Strategies to Combat Implicit Bias on the Bench, AM. BAR ASS’N
(Sept. 2016) [hereinafter 6 Strategies], https://www.americanbar.org/publications/
youraba/2016/september-2016/strategies-on-implicit-bias-and-de-biasing-for-judgesand-lawyer.html [https://perma.cc/U24F-HUZY].
113. See Perry Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An
Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 289 (2008)
(“Over the last thirty years, a number of increasingly sophisticated analyses have
documented a statistically significant ‘race effect’ on juvenile justice outcomes.”);
Margaret Olesnavage, Disproportionate Representation of Children of Color in the
Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Systems in Michigan, 89 MICH. B.J. 26, 26 (2010)
(“Youth of color are overrepresented at nearly every point of contact with the
juvenile justice system.”); Miriam Stohs, Racism in the Juvenile Justice System: A
Critical Perspective, 2 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 97, 109–10 (2003)
(discussing statistics illustrating racial discrepancies at every stage of the juvenile
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students in Florida, for example, were two and one-half times more
likely than white students to be arrested and referred to the juvenile
justice system in 2007–2008.114 Latino students in Colorado were fifty
percent more likely than white students to be referred to law
enforcement in 2006–2008.115
Statistically, black youth receive more severe sanctioning than
similarly situated white youth,116 receive harsher sentences for certain
behaviors,117 and are more likely to be held in secure detention which
statistically correlates with harsher sanctions in later proceedings
when compared to white youth.118 Black youth are also more likely
than white youth to receive a court referral for prosecution, rather
than to participate in a diversion program,119 and are
disproportionately removed from their homes.120
Often, the juvenile system is a backstop for inadequate mental
health care in communities of color.121 Black males, especially those
with mental health struggles, “are more likely to be referred
to . . . delinquency court than a treatment system.”122
Particularly concerning is the interplay between schools and
juvenile courts. The school-to-prison pipeline epidemic plagues U.S.
schools, as students of color—as well as students with a history of

justice process); Franklin E. Zimring, Minority Overrepresentation: On Causes and
Partial Cures, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra
note 24, at 169–86.
114. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW “ZERO
TOLERANCE” AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TOPRISON PIPELINE 19 (2010) (internal citations omitted), https://b.3cdn.net/
advancement/d05cb2181a4545db07_r2im6caqe.pdf
[https://perma.cc/486L-XWPP];
Neitz, supra note 79, at 132.
115. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 114, at 19; Neitz, supra note 79, at 132.
116. See Michael J. Leiber et al., The Likelihood of a “Youth Discount” in
Juvenile Court Sanctions: The Influence of Offender Race, Gender, and Age, 6 RACE
& JUST. 5, 8 (2016), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2153368715595088
[https://perma.cc/G5NR-L38M];
see
also
MICHAEL
J.
LEIBER,
THE
DISPROPORTIONATE OVERREPRESENTATION OF MINORITY YOUTH IN SECURE
FACILITIES: A SURVEY OF DECISION MAKERS AND DELINQUENTS 1, 54 (1993),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/pdf/disproportionate.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3JN-ABUN].
117. See Leiber et al., supra note 116, at 8–9.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See discussion infra Section I.B.
122. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN
JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY CASES 13 (2005) [hereinafter JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES];
Neitz, supra note 79, at 131–32; see also Thalia González, Youth Incarceration,
Health, and Length of Stay, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 45, 48, 52 (2017).
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abuse,
neglect,
poverty,
or
learning
disabilities—are
disproportionately targeted by policies that suspend, expel, and arrest
boys and girls for infractions in school.123
Explicit racial bias (as opposed to implicit racial bias) can, in
theory, be more easily rooted out among judges because it is more
apparent than implicit bias.124 However, evidence increasingly shows
that implicit bias is pervasive and that measures of implicit bias are
dissociated from measures of explicit bias.125 In other words, a judge
would not need to hold explicit biases to be implicitly biased.
Of course, racial disparities in the juvenile system are not all
attributable to judicial biases. But the discretion of juvenile court
judges “could allow personal racial bias or prejudice to have an
enhanced role in adjudications.”126 The pervasiveness of racial
disparities alone warrants maximum systemic protection against the
influence of racial bias in juvenile court.
Jurors are also susceptible to racial bias; however, the jury trial has
more substantial methods for protecting against such biases, including
voir dire, to root out prospective jurors with discernible biases,
Batson precedent to help ensure a more diverse composition of
juries,127 the ability of defendants to challenge convictions when

123. See Carla Amurao, Fact Sheet: How Bad Is the School-To-Prison Pipeline?,
PBS: TAVIS SMILEY REPORTS (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/tavissmiley/
tsr/education-under-arrest/school-to-prison-pipeline-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/5X
5N-MJAG]; see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, The School-to-Prison Pipeline’s Legal
Architecture: Lessons from the Spring Valley Incident and Its Aftermath,
45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 107–11 (2017).
124. See, e.g., Neitz, supra note 79, at 135 (“A juvenile court judge in Tennessee
was publicly censured for his habit of ruling against immigrant juveniles ‘based solely
on the real or perceived immigration status’ of the children or their parents. In a
formal Letter of Reprimand, the Court of the Judiciary noted that this judge’s actions
displayed ‘a perceived predetermination as to Hispanic individuals appearing before
[him].’” (citing Formal Letter of Reprimand, supra note 107)); see also Aldrich v.
State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 447 N.E.2d 1276, 1277 (N.Y. 1983) (per curium)
(upholding decision of State Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove juvenile
court judge from bench for using “profane, improper and menacing language” and
making “inappropriate racial references” during proceedings); Leiber et al., supra
note 116, at 7, 9 (noting that decision-makers racially stereotype black youth as
dangerous and unsuitable for release into the community). It is important to note
that the Leiber study does not focus on Latinos.
125. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1512 (2005);
see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV.
969, 994 (2006).
126. Neitz, supra note 79, at 132.
127. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986) (holding that prosecutors may
not use a preemptory challenge to dismiss a juror based solely on race).
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jurors overtly rely on racial stereotypes or animus,128 and the
protective dynamics of group decision-making.129
B.

The Protective Features of a Jury Trial

This Section briefly discusses three aspects of the jury trial that
protect against judicial bias: (1) group decision-making, (2) voir dire,
and (3) jury instructions. Policy-makers who are deciding how to
structure fact-finding in juvenile court should carefully consider how
vital these features are to the integrity of fact-finding.

1.

Group Decision-Making

The group decision-making feature of a jury trial system has
significant virtues. As veteran law professors Martin Guggenheim
and Randy Hertz have discussed, “the very fact that the
decisionmaker is an individual rather than a group” can distort the
perceptions and judgments of juvenile judges.130 The jury model,
which pulls together various people from the community, helps
ensure that “a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions,
and habits” bear on factual decision-making.131 Social science has
helped to demonstrate that jurors’ tendency to apply their respective
experiences and perspectives during deliberation enhances their
evaluation of evidence.132
Further, a single judge “may fail to notice some meaningful aspect
of a witness’s demeanor or some highly salient gesture or meaningful
glance by the witness while on the stand.”133 Drawing from the
experiences and perspective of just a single judge, rather than a full
jury, decreases the likelihood that “witnesses’ credibility will be
assessed accurately and facts correctly found.”134 To present another
example, while most judges are permitted to take notes during factfinding—unlike juries—“even the most assiduous note-taking judge
may neglect to jot down an important response by a

128. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“Where a juror
makes a clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or
animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the noimpeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence
of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”).
129. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
130. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 575.
131. Id. at 575–76.
132. Id. at 576.
133. Id. at 578.
134. Id. at 576.
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witness . . . because the judge failed to appreciate its significance at
the time.”135
Similarly, Guggenheim and Hertz emphasize that while appellate
review serves as a protection against overt judicial biases, “subtle
biases such as predispositions based on life experiences or long held
assumptions” are less apparent on appellate review of a paper
record.136 Subtle but dangerous biases such as situational biases,
pressures to be more efficient, and implicit racial biases are “most
likely to be uncovered—and corrected—by means of an interchange
between individuals with conflicting perspectives, such as what
typically occurs during a jury deliberation.”137 Deliberating through
the lens of competing views and life experiences is undeniably
beneficial to rooting out biases and to discerning the credibility of
witnesses and evidence.
The Supreme Court—despite largely
overlooking the issue in McKeiver—has expounded on the virtues of
large group decision-making in the jury context.138 Those virtues,
according to the Court, include meaningful deliberation,
remembering important facts and arguments, and a broader
representation of the community, including representation of
“minority groups.”139

2.

Voir Dire

Voir dire is a tool that is unique to the jury model and that
specifically serves to root out biases among potential fact-finders.
Voir dire allows attorneys and the court to scrutinize jurors for overt
and hidden biases. During voir dire, attorneys and the judge examine
jurors for experiences or belief-sets that may predispose them to ways
of viewing a case or an accused person.140 As Vazquez notes:
In a bench trial, however, there is no analogous opportunity to
explore the judge’s background. Without voir dire scrutiny to detect
the possibility of judicial bias, one must assume that judges have
incredible powers of self-reflection and are able to attend to their
conscious and unconscious mental processes and set aside any
prejudices they might reveal.141

135. Id. at 578.
136. Id. at 577.
137. Id.
138. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 241 (1978).
139. Id. at 237, 241.
140. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”,
27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 558–63 (1975).
141. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 198.

306

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

Voir dire serves to protect against many of the specific types of biases
outlined above by, for example, eliminating prospective jurors who
have had previous experiences with the parties or witnesses in a case
or who have had too much exposure to subject matter relating to a
case.142

3.

Jury Instructions

The process of instructing jurors in a criminal case also allows for
protection against biases that can undermine fact-finding. Jury
instructions allow for meaningful articulation of the law being applied
as well as an opportunity for appellate review.143 Without jury
instructions that “explain the judge’s understanding of the law, the
reviewing court is unable to determine whether the juvenile court
judge misunderstood or misapplied the law.”144 In bench trials where
judges are the fact-finders, it is said that, “juveniles lose out twice
because they are more likely to be convicted at trial and are very
unlikely to prove an error . . . on appeal.”145 Jury instructions also
serve as a powerful reminder from the court to jurors to make
decisions based only on admissible evidence.146
C.

Critiques of the Jury System

The jury system is, of course, not a perfect method of preventing
bias from detrimentally influencing fact-finding. Juries, for example,
have been known to make decisions based on racial animus.147 Juries
also often lack racial diversity, which functions to the detriment of
defendants of color.148
Additionally, recent exoneration data

142. See generally THOMAS MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES AND TRIALS 29–72 (9th
ed. 2013).
143. See Feld, supra note 15, at 250 n.425.
144. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 198–99.
145. Id. at 199.
146. See, e.g., 1-II Criminal Jury Instructions for DC Instruction 2.104 (2017).
147. See, e.g., Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 866 (2017) (“Where a
juror makes a clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or
animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the noimpeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence
of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”).
148. See, e.g., Rebecca McCray, All-White Juries Are Still a Big Problem for Black
Defendants, TAKEPART (May 31, 2016) (citing Steve Hartsoe, All-White Jury Pools
Convict Black Defendants 16 Percent More Often than Whites, DUKE TODAY (Apr.
17, 2012), https://today.duke.edu/2012/04/jurystudy [https://perma.cc/37R4-E72D]),
http://www.takepart.com/article/2016/05/27/racial-bias-jury-selection/
[https://perma.cc/U2D5-HE4X] (“All-white jury pools in Florida were 16 percent
more likely to convict black defendants than white defendants[.]”).
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provides a glimpse into how juries can wrongfully convict: since 1989,
there have been at least 2144 exonerations in the United States,149
including 20 people who had served time on death row.150
These dangers, however, are not more poignant in the jury system
than in bench trials. On the contrary, anecdotal case data suggests
that, with alarming frequency, juvenile court judges fail to apply the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard and instead convict on
insufficient evidence.151
Another critique of the jury trial is that group decision-making,
despite its benefits, is shrouded with secrecy, as the public is often not
privy to the nature and substance of jury deliberations.152 Judges-asfact-finders, on the other hand, sometimes back up their application
of the facts to the law with some analysis, either orally or in writing.
But the jury system, at least, has the additional protective
mechanisms discussed above—voir dire, jury instructions, and
opportunities for advocates to challenge verdicts based on jurors’
overt prejudices.153
Opponents of extending the jury to juvenile court cite the added
cost and decreased efficiency associated with the jury system.154
Implementing juries in juvenile court means various expenses
including jury stipends, additional courtrooms, new judges, and delays

149. THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/PU8R-78XH]; Caitlin Nolan,

After Doing 13 Years for a Murder He Didn’t Commit, Exonerated Man Adjusts to
Life on the Outside, INSIDE EDITION (Dec. 21, 2017), http://www.insideedition.com/

after-doing-13-years-murder-he-didnt-commit-exonerated-man-adjusts-life-outside39138 [https://perma.cc/ZC67-WSUJ].
150. DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/VL24-WYZT].
151. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 564–65 (citing five cases in one
year where a juvenile judge was overturned on appeal for convicting a juvenile on
insufficient of the evidence); Treaster, supra note 6, at 1303.
152. See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 528 (2014) (holding that jurors may not
testify about what went on during deliberations, even to expose dishonesty during
jury selection); see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (“[L]ongrecognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations
from intrusive inquiry.”). But see Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866 (noting an
exception to the usual rule that jury deliberations are secret when evidence of
extreme racial or ethnic bias emerges).
153. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866.
154. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (“If the jury trial were
to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it
into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary
system[.]”); Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 562–63; Treaster, supra note 6, at
1293.
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associated with selecting, instructing, and litigating before juries.155
The juvenile system, courts have said, should dispose promptly of
issues “without all the time-consuming procedures which accompany
trial by jury.”156
Where juvenile courts are falling short of
rehabilitation, some argue, adding the expense and delay of a jury
trial will not advance those rehabilitative aims.157 Further, as the
court emphasized in McKeiver, many people believe that introducing
jury trials threatens to “remake the juvenile proceeding into a full
adversary process and thus substantially deny the possibility that the
juvenile system would achieve its goals of prompt adjudications,
fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention.”158
In light of the increasingly apparent realities of judicial bias,
however, focus on costs is little more than a policy choice that
prioritizes efficiency over fairness. Further, a jury trial process would
not undermine other rehabilitative features of juvenile court, such as
diversion options, earlier involvement of probation officers and
families, access to social service agencies, or sentencing alternatives
that are less harsh than jail.159
III. LIMITING JUDICIAL BIAS IN JUVENILE COURT
Under McKeiver, jury rights for juveniles are not required by the
United States Constitution.160 The Court’s rationale in McKeiver
could one day be revisited in light of the stark realities of today’s
juvenile court. Until then, however, McKeiver explicitly left the door
open for states to extend the protection of a jury in juvenile court. In
his concurring opinion, Justice White noted that “[o]f course, there
are strong arguments that juries are desirable when dealing with the
young, and States are free to use juries if they choose.”161 This Part
discusses how, despite McKeiver, specific jurisdictions can and have
protected against judicial bias by extending jury rights to juveniles
and by creating procedural protections and mandating bias training.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Treaster, supra note 6, at 1293–94.
See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Murray v. Owens, 465 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1972).
See id.
Id. at 291; see also McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
See ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 19, at 436, 479, 506.
See supra Section I.D.
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553 (White, J., concurring).
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A. In Re L.M.: The Kansas Supreme Court Extends the Jury
Protection to Juveniles
In 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court decided In re L.M.,162 which
extended jury rights to juveniles in Kansas under the Kansas State
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.163 Sixteen-year-old L.M. was
charged with aggravated sexual battery as well as being a minor in
possession of alcohol.164 L.M. was accused of making inappropriate
sexual contact and comments toward a neighbor.165 L.M. requested a
jury but was denied, and was found guilty by a judge at a bench
trial.166 His punishment included probation for five years, sex
offender treatment, and registration as a sex offender.167
The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished L.M.’s case from
McKeiver and extended jury trial rights to juveniles statewide.168 The
Kansas Supreme Court based its decision not on the risks of judicial
bias, but on the fact that recent changes to the Kansas juvenile justice
system had “eroded the benevolent . . . character that distinguished
[the juvenile system] from the adult system.”169 Specifically, the
Kansas juvenile code supplanted non-punitive language with more
punitive language, aligned the juvenile and adult sentencing
guidelines, and diminished a host of other protections that served to
distinguish juvenile and adult court, such as private proceedings and
confidentiality of records.170 As a result, the Kansas Supreme Court
explained, juvenile justice in Kansas had little differentiation from the
adult system.171 Without the paternalistic protections previously
afforded, McKeiver’s rationale did not apply to Kansas, and juveniles
became entitled to the protection of a jury at fact-finding under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well
as the Kansas State Constitution.172
Although judicial bias was not an explicit focus of In re L.M., the
Kansas Supreme Court nonetheless provided a sound rationale that
other state courts can follow to extend the jury protection in juvenile

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008).

Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re L.M., No. 96,197, 2006 WL 3775275, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 170.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 170–72.
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court—to acknowledge similarities between juvenile court and adult
criminal court. Where state legislatures, as in Kansas, further erode
the parens patriae features of juvenile court through changes to
juvenile code provisions, policy-makers and juvenile advocates might
find ripe ground to argue that the jury protection should be
reconsidered, McKeiver notwithstanding.
Certain states, such as Texas, New Hampshire, and Montana have
followed Kansas’s lead and fully extended jury rights to juvenile
court, while several other jurisdictions afford the protection only
under certain circumstances related to age and severity of
accusation.173 Today, however, in most jurisdictions, judges not juries
remain the finders of fact despite the risk of judicial bias.174
B.

Ways (Other than a Jury) to Protect Against Judicial Bias

As statutory creations, juvenile courts can be altered by state
policy-makers.175
Legislatures, administrative judges, and even
individual judges can introduce measures to reduce judicial bias. This
Section describes ways that policy-makers can—and should—limit
judicial bias in jurisdictions that do not have jury protections for
juveniles.

1.

Ensuring Different Judges for Different Phases of the Case

In some jurisdictions, a juvenile court judge who presides over
pretrial detention or transfer hearings (during which alleged facts are
commonly presented) must recuse himself from fact-finding at the
defense’s request.176 To maximize protections against bias due to
exposure to inadmissible information, a rule should exist that “all
pretrial matters, including detention pending trial, transfer to adult
court, and suppression of evidence, [should] be heard by a judge other
than the one who will preside over the trial.”177 This different-judgefor-trial rule can be taken further. For example, Guggenheim and
Hertz propose placing a burden on litigants: require them to raise all
questionable evidentiary issues before trial during motions in limine
to decrease the chance that the fact-finder will be presented with

173. See NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. COUNCIL, JUVENILE RIGHT TO JURY CHART 2, 8, 9,
13 (2014), http://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Right-to-Jury-Trial-Chart-718-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE47-JM6T].
174. See generally id.
175. See Segadelli, supra note 17, at 689.
176. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 583.
177. Id. at 584.
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inadmissible, and potentially prejudicial, information.178 The threat
of sanctions against the party that fails to present such tainting
information in limine, however, would need to be meaningful for this
protective measure to work.179
Another procedural mechanism—issue-based certification—allows
for judges to briefly certify cases to other judges to resolve
evidentiary and other potentially prejudicial issues during trial.180 For
jurisdictions with only one juvenile court judge, criminal court judges
or even civil court judges can handle issues that might lead to bias
because of exposure to prejudicial information.181

2.

Recusal

Guggenheim and Hertz also suggest less formal mechanisms, such
as recusal, as a way to protect against judicial bias resulting from
exposure to inadmissible information.182 Administrative judges who
set courthouse policies, or individual juvenile judges taking seriously
their desire to appear fair and to reduce bias, can more liberally
recuse themselves upon counsel’s motion, or even sua sponte, after
being exposed to inadmissible information.183 Today, recusal motions
are rarely requested because they are rarely granted, since judges
generally uphold the fiction that they are not prejudiced by exposure
to information they are not supposed to consider.

3.

Seeking Advisory Juries and Group Deliberation

Courts and individual judges can also “modify the [juvenile] bench
trial model to secure some of the virtues of careful, thorough
deliberation” that exists in the jury system.184 For example, to
incorporate the virtues of group decision-making such as the benefit
of various perspectives,185 judges can follow the possibility raised by
the McKeiver court, that is, to empanel advisory juries.186
Guggenheim and Hertz propose a less formal and more convenient

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 585.
185. See supra Section II.B.1.
186. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548 (1971) (“There is, of course,
nothing to prevent a juvenile court judge, in a particular case where he feels the need,
or when the need is demonstrated, from using an advisory jury.”).
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approach that could have a similar effect: judges can routinely discuss
cases with their fellow judges before rendering a verdict.187

4.

Utilizing Jury Instructions in Bench Trials

To further protect against bias, juvenile judges can borrow the
important feature of jury instructions. Despite the prominence of
jury instructions in guiding juries prior to deliberation, judges in
bench trials rarely instruct themselves by explaining what law they are
applying to a fact-finding decision. Requiring judges to verbalize the
jury instructions they are applying—or, even better, to incorporate
instructions into written findings—can help to eliminate unconscious
bias, to remind judges of the standard of proof, and to ensure that
judges are deciding cases on applicable law rather than inadmissible
information to which they have been exposed. The use of instructions
by judges would have the added benefit of allowing attorneys and
appellate courts to better understand the legal standards that judges
applied or failed to apply to a case and to take appropriate action on
appeal.

5.

Managing Situational Biases Through Increased Self-Awareness

Courts and individual judges should also work to understand and
protect against situational biases that unnecessarily influence legal
decisions. As the Danziger et al. study188 suggests, favorable rulings
in legally similar cases can vary based on the temporal proximity of
those decisions to a judge’s food break or to the beginning of the
workday.189 Common experience dictates that human decisionmaking can be influenced by exhaustion, anxiety, sadness, and
hunger. Juvenile court judges should make a point of reflecting with
their colleagues about what life circumstances may unduly influence
their decision-making and then work to postpone important factfinding decisions when they are experiencing grief, exhaustion, or
even if they have not yet had lunch.

6.

Understanding and Limiting the Influence of Implicit Bias

The data around bias—especially implicit racial bias—and its likely
contribution to racial disparities in the juvenile system is problematic.
Courts and individual judges should receive bias training and should

187. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 585.
188. See Danziger et al., supra note 84.
189. See supra Section II.A.3.
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adopt techniques to understand and mitigate the influence of implicit
bias. As social psychologists Jeffrey Rachlinski, Judge Andrew
Wistrich, and law professors Chris Guthrie and Sheri Lynn Johnson
found: “when judges are aware of a need to monitor their own
responses for the influence of implicit racial biases, and are motivated
to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”190 Additionally,
researchers at the National Center for State Courts have emphasized:
Avoiding the influence of implicit bias . . . is an effortful, as opposed
to automatic, process and requires intention, attention, and time.
Combating implicit bias, much like combating any habit, involves
“becoming aware of one’s implicit bias, being concerned about the
consequences of the bias, and learning to replace the biased
response with non-prejudiced responses—ones that more closely
match the values people consciously believe that they hold.”191

In 2016, the American Bar Association hosted a workshop that
sought to invest some of the “intention, attention and time” necessary
to combat implicit bias.192 The workshop was for state and federal
judges from around the country and examined the problem of implicit
bias and explored practical strategies that judges can utilize to “debias.”193 The workshop featured a bias training video called “Hidden
Injustice: Bias on the Bench.”194 The video features well-known
judges, law professors, and experts.195 It raises awareness of implicit
bias and provides practical methods of understanding and combating
it.196 The video and similar resources can serve as important tools for
judges.197 The following techniques and strategies, for example, are
recommended on a weekly basis as a way that judges (and everyone,
for that matter) can mitigate their implicit biases:

190. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1195, 1221 (2009).
191. Pamela M. Casey et al., Addressing Implicit Bias in the Courts, 49 AM.

JUDGES ASS’N CT. REV. 64, 69 (2013) (internal emphasis omitted) (quoting Bridget M.
Law, Retraining the Biased Brain, 42 MONITOR ON PSYCH. 42, 43 (2011)),
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/courtrv/cr49-1/CR49-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2N7GKF2].
192. See 6 Strategies, supra note 112.
193. Id.
194. Id.; Hidden Injustice: Bias on the Bench, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 8, 2016)
[hereinafter Hidden Injustice], https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/abanews-archives/2016/02/hidden_injusticebi.html [https://perma.cc/ADU2-FFZ4]. This
video is still available online, free of charge, at the time of publication.
195. See 6 Strategies, supra note 112.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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 Take the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”). The IAT helps
increase awareness by identifying stereotypes that affect, often
unknowingly, personal perceptions of the character and qualities
of different races and ethnic groups. 198
 Individuation. Gather specific information about a person (e.g.,
background, family) so that judgments consider the particulars
of a person rather than assumed group characteristics.199
 Replace stereotypes. Recognize when we are “responding to a
situation or person in a stereotypical fashion” and consider the
reasons for this response. Then actively replace the biased
response with an unbiased one.200
 Engage in counter-stereotypic imaging.
After detecting a
stereotyped response, think of well-known people that
undermine the stereotype, thereby “provid[ing] concrete
examples that demonstrate the inaccuracy of stereotypes.”201
 Perspective-taking. Assess the emotional damage of stereotyping
by considering the perspectives of stereotyped people. Thinking
about, for example, how it would feel to be viewed certain ways
because of your appearance.202
 Increase opportunities for contact. Seek positive interactions
with stereotyped groups. Participate in events, for example, that
allow for meeting people who disconfirm stereotypes. Change
the movies, TV and news that we consume to features that do
not portray groups stereotypically.203

Utilizing these techniques appears to have had demonstrable impact
on the prevalence of implicit bias.204
Likewise, in 2013, several researchers from the National Center for
State Courts (“NCSC”) published Addressing Implicit Bias in the
Courts, which provides over a dozen practical strategies that
individuals and courts can take to reduce the influence of implicit
bias.205 The NCSC recommends, for example, diversity training as
well as the development of guidelines and the use of deliberative

198. Project Implicit, Implicit Association Test, IMPLICIT.HARVARD.EDU (2011),
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html [https://perma.cc/5Z5U-AF8V];
6 Strategies, supra note 112; Hidden Injustice, supra note 194.
199. See 6 strategies, supra note 112.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.; Hidden Injustice, supra note 194.
204. See 6 Strategies, supra note 112.
205. See Casey et al., supra note 191.
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decision-support tools among decision-makers.206
The NCSC
recommends that judges consult with colleagues to increase
deliberative thinking and to decrease the intuitive thinking in which
implicit biases linger.207 The NCSC also recommends that courts
review areas where judges are over-burdened and consider options
for modifying procedures to provide more time for decisionmaking.208
Courts and individual judges should acknowledge the realities of
implicit bias among judges and the potential impact that bias likely
has on the overrepresentation of people of color in the juvenile justice
system. They should follow the lead of the recent American Bar
Association conference and the National Center for State Courts by
prioritizing the resources available to understand and reduce implicit
bias.
C.

The Importance of Juveniles Perceiving Juvenile Court to Be
Fair

Policy-makers who assume, as the Supreme Court apparently
has,209 that fact-finding in juvenile court is not undermined by judicial
bias should still consider how important it is that our young people
perceive their experience in juvenile court as fair. Juveniles of course
recognize the dangers of biased judges. Juveniles can understand the
risk of being pre-judged at fact-finding by a judge who is exposed to
inadmissible information, a judge who is too focused on hurrying the
proceedings along, or a judge who has prejudices toward certain
juveniles because of how they look or where they are from. Juveniles
understand that people struggle to intentionally ignore information
they have been exposed to. Even if a judge can control his or her
biases when making decisions, the risk is real that the fact-finding
process without juries or other procedural protections does not
appear fair to the young person whose future is being litigated.
Significant criminological research suggests that “when citizens
perceive justice system agencies to be fair, they are more likely to
comply with the law, legal authorities and court mandates.”210

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 67.
See supra Section I.D.

M. SOMJEN FRAZER, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE IMPACT OF THE
COMMUNITY COURT MODEL ON DEFENDANT PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS: A CASE
STUDY AT THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER 3 (2006) (citing TOM R.
TYLER & YUEN HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
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Studies of mediation211 and of domestic violence courts212 also
support the notion that perceptions of fairness affect one’s decision to
accept the outcome of the court process and to comply with its
mandates.213
Somewhat surprisingly, research also suggests that litigants’
opinions about court experiences are based more on procedural
fairness than they are on the outcome of a case.214 Indeed, having a
neutral and trustworthy decision-maker is one of the key dimensions
informing the perceptions of fairness among court-involved people.215
The appearance of an impartial judge enhances the sense that court is
fair.216
Jury trials and the other procedural protections that are outlined
above not only limit opportunities for judicial bias, but these
protections serve to limit the perception of unfairness during juvenile
court fact-finding.
Among malleable young people who are
developing their beliefs about the justice system, a process that
appears fair to them is important for the legitimacy of juvenile court
as an institution and for the likelihood that young people will follow
the mandates that the court may impose.
CONCLUSION
Historically, the jury trial as a protection for the accused has been
fundamental to the American concept of justice.217 The Supreme
Court, however, did not broaden this protection to juvenile court
despite all the other constitutional rights that were extended to that
forum.218 The Court rationalized this, in part, by concluding that even

WITH THE POLICE AND THE COURTS (2002)), http://www.courtinnovation.org/
sites/default/files/Procedural_Fairness.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHC2-T445].
211. Id. (first citing E. Allen Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute
Resolution: Using Procedural Justice as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224
(1993); then citing Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 313, 314 (1993)).
212. Id. (citing Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The
Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 170
(1997)).
213. Id. at 1, 3.
214. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 210, at 49–57. See generally Jonathan D.
Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483 (1988);
Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in
Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (1993).
215. See FRAZER, supra note 210, at 3.
216. Id. at 29.
217. See supra Section I.A.
218. See supra Sections I.C, I.D.

2017]

PROTECTING AGAINST JUDICIAL BIAS

317

though liberty interests are at stake and juvenile courts now resemble
adult courts, the jury protection is still not necessary because judges
are as competent as juries at fact-finding.219 The Court, however, said
little about the reality of judicial bias.220
Social science has helped show that juvenile court judges are
uniquely susceptible to various forms of bias.221 Their fact-finding
decisions can be unduly influenced by legally irrelevant information,
ranging from when their last food break was to implicit racial
stereotypes.222 Although jurors are not immune to such influences,
features of the jury trial—such as group decision-making, voir dire,
and the practice of jury instructions—mitigate the dangers of such
biases among jurors.223
Those who oppose juries and other procedural protections against
judicial bias in juvenile court often cite concerns of efficiency and
sparse resources.224 This is a valid concern because juvenile courts
are under-resourced and understaffed.225 Indeed, most of the
protective measures suggested in this Essay would slow down the
juvenile adjudication process and would require that additional
resources be directed to juvenile court. However, with the evidence
of judicial bias mounting, fact-finding is not the place to cut costs.
Doing so risks over-involving innocent young people in a juvenile
system that has serious consequences.226 Resources in juvenile court
can be conserved in other ways. The government, for instance, can
stop arresting and adjudicating children for typical teenage behavior,
or it can make substantially greater use of non-court diversion
options.227
If the United States Supreme Court and state courts do not protect
juveniles with a jury trial, then policy-makers and judges should
institute procedural protections and awareness training that limits
judicial bias.228 Limiting judicial bias at fact-finding will better
protect children and will inform the extent to which young people
perceive the juvenile justice system as fair.229 If young people believe
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the process to be fair they are more likely to comply with its
requirements and respect the justice system as a whole. We must
strive to better protect our young people from judicial bias at factfinding. The lives of our young people, simply put, matter too much
to prioritize efficiency over fairness.

